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ABSTRACT
Tor provides low-latency anonymous and uncensored network ac-
cess against a local or network adversary. Due to the design choice
to minimize traffic overhead (and increase the pool of potential
users) Tor allows some information about the client’s connections
to leak. Attacks using (features extracted from) this information
to infer the website a user visits are called Website Fingerprinting
(WF) attacks. We develop a methodology and tools to measure the
amount of leaked information about a website. We apply this tool
to a comprehensive set of features extracted from a large set of
websites and WF defense mechanisms, allowing us to make more
fine-grained observations about WF attacks and defenses.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Tor anonymity network uses layered encryption and traffic
relays to provide private, uncensored network access to millions
of users per day. This use of encryption hides the exact contents
of messages sent over Tor, and the use of sequences of three relays
prevents any single relay from knowing the network identity of
both the client and the server. In combination, these mechanisms
provide effective resistance to basic traffic analysis.
However, because Tor provides low-latency, low-overhead com-
munication, it does not hide traffic features such as the volume,
timing, and direction of communications. Recent works [22, 34, 46]
have shown that these features leak information about which web-
site has been visited to the extent that a passive adversary that
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records this information is able to train a classifier to recognize
the website with more than 90% accuracy in a closed-world sce-
nario with 100 websites. This attack is often referred to as a Web-
site Fingerprinting (WF) attack. In response, many works [5, 6, 9,
11, 33, 35, 37, 46, 48, 49] have proposed defenses that attempt to
hide this information, by padding connections with extra traffic or
rearranging the sequence in which files are requested.
Defense Evaluation. To evaluate a defense, the popular practice
is to train classifiers based on altered traffic characteristics and
evaluate the effect of the defense by classification accuracy. If the
accuracy of the classifier is low enough, the defense is believed
to be secure with minimal information leakage; one defense is be-
lieved to be better than another if it results in lower accuracy.
Accuracy vs. Information Leakage.We raise a question: does low
accuracy alwaysmean low information leakage fromWFdefenses?
Our answer is no. The first reason is that accuracy is classifier-
dependent. It is possible that the information leakage of a WF de-
fense is high, but the classifier is ineffective, so that its accuracy is
low. More importantly, accuracy is all-or-nothing: classifiers out-
put a single guess and if it is wrong, this is judged to mean the
defense has been successful. But it ignores cases where a classifier
may confuse some pages with a small set of others. In such situa-
tions, an attacker may well be able to significantly reduce the set
of likely pages represented by a fingerprint, even if they cannot
reliably choose the correct page from among this set. We can see
that the fingerprint can contain a great deal of information about
the web page even if the classifier cannot accurately identify the
correct page. Accuracy is prone to underestimate the information
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Figure 1: Accuracy vs. Information Leakage.This figure shows
the range of potential information leakage for a given classification
accuracy (in the closed-world setting with 100 websites)
leakage in WF defenses, or in other words, low accuracy doesn’t
necessarily mean low information leakage.
We further prove the above observation by the information-theoretic
quantification upon a given accuracy. We find that in a closed-
world setting with n websites, a feature set yielding a classifier
with accuracy α could leak information through the classifier with
the uncertain range (1−α) log2(n − 1) (the difference between the
maximum and minimum). The proof also shows that such uncer-
tainty increases with lower accuracy. Figure 1 shows that when
n = 100 and α = 0.95, the uncertain range is only 0.33 bit; but
when α = 0.05, the possible leakage could be as high as 6.36 bits
and as low as 0.06 bits! This uncertainty reveals the potential dis-
crepancy between information leakage and accuracy in evaluating
WF defenses, though its impact on WF attacks is limited. Low in-
formation leakage implies low classification accuracy, but the con-
verse is not necessarily true, thus we argue that validating WF
defenses by accuracy alone is flawed.
FeatureEvaluation.Different featuresmay carry different amounts
of information. WF defense designers can evaluate features to find
more informative ones to hide [6]; attackers can do so to discover
highly informative features and optimize their feature set [22]. Ex-
isting works [6, 22] designed comparative methods to rank the fea-
tures by their information leakage, but these methodologies do not
give a straightforward way to quantify the relationships between
features. How much information do features A and B share? If fea-
ture A is more informative than features B or C alone, are features
B and C together more informative than A? These methodologies
are unable to answer these questions.
We argue that these coarse-grained evaluations of features and
defenses are overly simplistic. The analysis of new WF attack fea-
tures and defenses should start with the question: howmuch infor-
mation is leaked? To answer this question, two challenges should
be addressed. The first challenge is finding a way to model the be-
havior ofWF features and the interaction between them; these fea-
tures can have highly complex relationships and behavior, exhibit-
ing distributions that could be discrete, continuous, or even partly
discrete and partly continuous. The second challenge is the curse
of dimensionality when estimating the total information leakage,
as the state-of-art feature sets are usually high-dimensional. Un-
fortunately, existing works [10, 32] limited their experimental mea-
surement to features’ individual information leakage, and they can-
not overcome these challenges.
Information LeakageMeasurement Framework. In this paper,
we develop WeFDE (forWebsite Fingerprint Density Estimation),
a methodology for modelling the likelihood functions of website
fingerprints, and a set of tools formeasuring the fingerprints’ infor-
mation leakage. To address the first challenge, WeFDE uses adap-
tive kernel density estimation [44] to model the probability den-
sity function of a feature or a category of features. By allowing
kernels to determine their bandwidth separately, we adaptively
model both continuous and discrete density functions; by estimat-
ing multi-dimensional kernels over sets of features, we model the
interactions between features. We address the second challenge by
introducing a set of dimension reduction approaches. Firstly, we
measure features’ pairwise mutual information to exclude redun-
dant features. Secondly, we use Kononenko’s Algorithm [8, 27] and
DBSCAN [13] to separate features into sub-groups, which have
pairwisemutual information higher than a threshold ϵ within each
group, and lower than ϵ among different groups. Then we apply
adaptive kernels for each sub-group with reduced dimensionality.
Finally, our experiment shows that by including enough highly in-
formative features we are able to approximate the overall informa-
tion leakage. This enables us to further reduce the dimensionality
of our measurement.
MeasurementResults.We applyWeFDE to a comprehensive list
of 3043 features (including, to the best of our knowledge, all fea-
tures in the TorWF literature [7, 11, 22, 34, 36, 40, 46, 47]) extracted
from a 211219 Tor web browsing visits for about 2200 websites.
Among the features of WF attacks, we find that: (a) 45.36% of 183
most informative features are redundant; (b) an individual feature
leaks no more than 3.45 bits information in the closed-world set-
ting with 100 websites, which is the maximum leakage we observe
in our experiment from the feature of rounded outgoing packet
count; (c) download stream, though having more packets than up-
load stream, leaks less information; (d) a larger world size has lit-
tle impact on a WF feature’s individual information leakage. We
also include WF defenses such as Tamaraw [6], BuFLO [11], Su-
persequence [46], WTF-PAD [25], and CS-BuFLO [5] to study the
discrepancy between accuracy and information leakage. Our ex-
perimental results confirm this discrepancy and demonstrate that
accuracy alone is not reliable to validate a WF defense or compare
multiple ones. We also find that the information leakage of WTF-
PAD [25] is unusually high. Interestingly, recent work [42] con-
firms our result by achieving 90% classification accuracy against
WTF-PAD.
Contributions.Weprovide our contributions as follows. First, this
paper identifies that validating WF defenses by accuracy alone is
flawed. By information-theoretic quantification, we find that when
accuracy is low, its corresponding information leakage is far from
certain. Second, we propose WeFDE which makes it possible to
measure the joint information leakage from a large set of features.
In contrast, existing works only limited their experimental mea-
surement to features’ individual information leakage, and they can-
not cope with features of complex property. WeFDE overcomes
these two limitations. We also release the source code of WeFDE
in the GitHub repository1. Third, we use WeFDE to perform infor-
mation leakage measurement for all 3043 features proposed in the
Tor website fingerprinting literature, based on a large dataset hav-
ing 211219 Tor web browsing visits to about 2200 websites. As far
as we know, our work is the first large-scale information leakage
measurement in the literature. Fourth, our measurement results
provide the new information-theoretic insights upon WF features,
and these results give the empirical confirmation that accuracy is
not reliable to validate a WF defense or compare multiple ones.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 and Section 3 give
background and related works on WF attacks and defenses, with
Section 4 introducing the features. Section 5 introduces the system
design ofWeFDE. Section 6, Section 7, Section 8, and Section 9 give
1https://github.com/s0irrlor7m/InfoLeakWebsiteFingerprint
information leakage measurement results, and Section 10 provides
discussions. Finally, we conclude in Section 11.
2 WF ATTACK MODELS
A WF attacker aims at learning which website a user has visited.
The attacker can be an Internet Service Provider (ISP) or a mali-
cious Tor entry guard. It is supposed to be passive (no packet ma-
nipulation), but it can eavesdrop the traffic originated from or des-
tinated to the user. Without turning to traffic contents or its IP
addresses (both can be encrypted or obfuscated), the attacker in-
spects the traffic fingerprints for detection. These fingerprints can
be packet length or the transmission time. Neither Cryptographic
algorithms nor the anonymous services such as Tor can cover such
fingerprints. State of art attacks [22, 34, 46] demonstrate that the
fingerprints carry sufficient information that the attacker can pin-
point the visited website by more than 90% accuracy (with assump-
tions). In the following, we introduce two attackmodels of theweb-
site fingerprinting attack.
Closed-World AttackModel. An attacker in the closed-world
knows a set of websites C = {c1, c2, · · · , cn} the user may visit.
We adopt an equal-prior model, in which the user visits a website
with probability 1/n. The attacker’s goal is to decide which oneis
visited.
Open-World Attack Model. The attacker in this attack model
has a set of websites for monitoring; its goal is to decide whether
the user visited a monitored website or not, and if yes, which moni-
toredwebsite. Though the usermay visit anywebsite, a non-monitored
set of websites are introduced to approximate the user visiting the
non-monitored websites. We consider a popularity-priormodel, in
which we give prior probabilities to websites by their popularity,
without considering whether the websites are monitored or not.
3 RELATED WORK
Website Fingerprinting Attacks. The first category of WF at-
tacks targeted encrypted protocolswith no packet length hiding [30].
More recent website fingerprinting attacks focus on Tor anony-
mous service, in which the unique packet length is hidden by fixed-
size Tor cells. Cai et al. [7] used edit distance to compare Tor packet
sequences, and achieved 86% accuracy in the closed-world scenario
with 100websites. Wang and Goldberg [47] further improve the ac-
curacy to 91% by using Tor cells instead of TCP/IP packets, delet-
ing SENDMEs, and applying new metrics such as fast Levenshtein.
Their later work [46] increases the accuracy by using a KNN clas-
sifier. Panchenko et al. [34] introduces a new method to extract the
packet number information, which increases the accuracy by 2%.
Recently, Hayes and Danezis [22] use random forests to construct
the current state-of-art website fingerprinting attack.
Website FingerprintingDefenses.Several defenses have been
proposed to defeat WF attacks. One category of defenses try to ran-
domize the traffic fingerprints by traffic morphing [49], loading a
background page [35], or randomized pipelining [37]. These are
demonstrated ineffective by several works [7, 46].
Another category of defenses try to hide traffic features by de-
terministic approaches. By holding the packets or creating dummy
packets, BuFLO [11] requires the packets sent in fixed size and
fixed time interval. The packets are padded until reaching a trans-
mission time threshold τ if their original transmission time is shorter.
Otherwise, BuFLO lets the traffic finish. CS-BuFLO [5] is proposed
to extend BuFLO to include congestion sensitivity and some rate
adaptation. Tamaraw [6] improves the efficiency of BuFLO by two
methods. First, it allows different transmission rate for outbound
and inbound traffic. Second, it pads to make the packet count a
multiple of parameter L: if the packet number in one direction is
more than nL and less than (n + 1)L, it sends padding packets un-
til the count is (n + 1)L. Supersequence [46] utilizes clustering al-
gorithms to group websites. For each group of websites, Superse-
quence computes a super trace to be the manner of transmitting
the instances of the websites under this group.WTF-PAD [25] uses
adaptive padding to be efficient. Our paper includes these defenses
for information leakage evaluation. We leave recently proposed de-
fenses [9, 48] in our future work.
Website Fingerprinting Evaluation. Juarez et al. [24] eval-
uates the effectiveness of WF attacks in practical scenarios, enu-
merating several assumptions about user settings, adversary capa-
bilities, and the nature of the web that do not always hold. With-
out these assumptions, the accuracy of the attacks are significantly
decreased. Cai et al. [6] use a comparative method to analyze de-
fenses. They apply generators to transform a website class C into
C ′, making C and C ′ differ only by one (category of) feature. Then
they evaluate whether a specific defense is successful in hiding the
feature. Though they claim this method can shed light on which
features convey more information, the information leakage com-
parison between features is unclear and not quantified.
Cherubin [18] provides the lower bound estimate for an attacker’s
error. The error of the Nearest Neighbor classifier is used to esti-
mate the lower bound of the Bayes error, which is further used to
be the lower bound for the error of any classifier. Based on such
lower bound, a new privacy metric called (ξ ,Φ)–privacy is pro-
posed. Though this privacy metric is not dependent on any spe-
cific classifier, it is still a variant of the accuracy/error metric, and
therefore the flaw of accuracy also applies to (ξ ,Φ)–privacy.
Security Measurement by Information Theory. There are
two information leakage studies in website fingerprinting attacks,
but they are limited from quantification methodology and dataset
size, to feature set and analysis. Such limitations prevent them
from answering the question: how much information in total is
leaked from the website fingerprint?
Chothia et al. [10] proposed a system called leakiEst to quan-
tify information leakage from an observable output about a sin-
gle secret value. Then leakiEst was applied on e-passports and Tor
traffic. However, leakiEst can only measure the information leak-
age of a single feature, rather than a category of features or all
features. In addition, it only included 10 visits for 500 websites in
their dataset, and it just considered 75 features. Furthermore, leaki-
Est cannot deal with information leakage under various scenarios,
such as open-world setting and setting with defenses.
Mather et al. [32] quantified the side-channel information leak-
age about the user’s inputs in the web applications. However, the
work shared many of the above limitations. The experiment only
considered packet size features; the size of the dataset was un-
known; the quantification only came to a single feature. Though
the work included the multivariate extension, it didn’t apply it in
the experiment, and it didn’t have dimension reduction to handle
the curse of the dimensionality.
Source Instances Batches
Closed-World Alexa 1-100 55779 20
Open-
World
Monitor [46] 17985 8
Non-Monitor Alexa 1-2000 137455 10
Table 1: DATASET.We adopt Crawler [3] to collect the network
traffic in batches. This crawler uses Selenium to automate the Tor
Browser Bundle and applies Stem library to control the Tor pro-
cess. It extended the circuit renewal period to 600,000 minutes and
disabled UseEntryGuard to avoid using a fixed set of entry guards.
We apply the method in [34] to extract the cell packets from the
traffic and measure the information leakage based on the cell pack-
ets.2
In comparison, our paper overcomes these limitations, and it
canmeasure information leakage froma category of features. Specif-
ically, it includes all 3043 features proposed in Tor WF literatures
and much larger dataset with 211219 visits. The resulting infor-
mation leakage quantification is therefore more accurate and rep-
resentative. It’s able to quantify information leakage of a set of
features with high dimension, so that it can tell how much infor-
mation is leaked in total. More importantly, our paper not only
quantifies the information leakage, but also reveals and analyzes
the discrepancy between accuracy and information leakage when
validating WF defenses. Our exprimental results demonstrate the
flaw of accuracy.
Mutual Information Estimation.Kernel Density Estimate (KDE)
and k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) are two popular approaches to
estimate the mutual information between two random variables.
They are believed to outperform other estimators due to their abil-
ity to capture the nonlinear dependence where present [26]. In
this paper, we choose KDE instead of k-NN for the following rea-
sons. Firstly, k-NN tends to underestimate mutual information be-
tween strongly dependent variables [16, 41]. In security settings,
this means the measured information leakage would be less than
it should be, making k-NN unsuitable for information leakage mea-
surement. More importantly, we find that the KSG estimator [28],
which is the most popular k-NN estimator, is unable to handle a
categorial random variable. This limitation matters because in Sec-
tion 5.1 we will see one of variables is about website information,
which is categorial. We further confirm the above two reasons by
an experiment. We find the total information leakage measured by
the KSG estimator is around 2 bits in a closed-world setting with
100websites, much lower thanwhatWF attacks have shown. Thus,
we choose the KDE approach in our paper.
4 TRAFFIC AND ITS FEATURES
A user’s traffic is a sequence of packets with timestamps which
are originated from or destinated to it. We use T (C) to denote the
traffic when the user visited the website C . Then
T (C) = 〈(t0, l0), (t1, l1), · · · , (tm , lm)〉 , (1)
where (ti , li ) corresponds to a packet of length |li | in bytes with a
timestamp ti in seconds. The sign of li indicates the direction of
2Our dataset allows the websites to have different number of instances. This uneven
distribution is mostly caused by the failed visits in the crawling process. Note that it
doesn’t impact our information leakage measurement.
Index Category Name [Adopted by] No.
1 Packet Count [11, 22, 34, 36, 46] 13
2 Time Statistics [11, 22, 46] 24
3 Ngram [this paper] 124
4 Transposition [22, 46] 604
5 Interval-I [22, 46] 600
6 Interval-II [40] 602
7 Interval-III [36] 586
8 Packet Distribution [22] 225
9 Bursts [46] 11
10 First 20 Packets [46] 20
11 First 30 Packets [22] 2
12 Last 30 Packets [22] 2
13 Packet Count per Second [22] 126
14 CUMUL Features [34] 104
Table 2: Feature Set. 3043 features from 14 categories
the packet: a positive value denotes that it is originated from the
server, otherwise the user sent the packet. Table 1 describes our
collected traffic for information leakage measurement.
In the state-of-art website fingerprinting attacks [22, 34, 46], it
is the features of the traffic rather than the traffic itself that an
attacker uses for deanonymization. One of the contribution of this
paper is that it measures a complete set of existing traffic features
in literatures of website fingerprinting attacks in Tor [11, 22, 34,
36, 40, 46]. Table 2 summarizes these features by category. More
details about the feature set can be found in Appendix E.
5 SYSTEM DESIGN
5.1 Methodology
The features leak information about which website is visited. To-
tal packet count is a good example. Figure 2 shows that visiting
www.google.de creates 700 to 1000 packets, while browsing www.facebook.com
results in 1100 to 1600 packets. Suppose an attacker passively mon-
itors a Tor user’s traffic, and it knows that the user has visited one
of these twowebsites (closed-world assumption). By inspecting the
total packet count of the traffic, the attacker can tell which website
is visited.
Different features may carry different amounts of information.
Figure 2 displays the download time in visiting www.google.de
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Figure 2: Different features may carry different amount
of information. Take transmission time and total packet count
as an example. This figure shows the latter carries more infor-
mation in telling which website is visited (www.google.de or
www.facebook.com)
Figure 3: WeFDE’s Architecture
and www.facebook.com. The former loads in about 3 to 20 sec-
onds, and the latter takes 5 to 20 seconds; Their distributions of
download time are not easily separable. As a result, the attacker
learns much less information from the download time than from
total packet count in the same closed-world scenario.
This raises question of how to quantify the information leakage
for different features. We adopt mutual information [31], which
evaluates the amount of information about a random variable ob-
tained through another variable, which is defined as:
DEFINITION. Let F be a random variable denoting the traffic’s
fingerprint, and supposeW to be the website information, then
I (F ;W ) is the amount of information that an attacker can learn
from F aboutW , which equals to:
I (F ;W ) = H (W ) − H (W |F ) (2)
I (·) is mutual information, andH (·) is entropy. In the following, we
describe our system to measure this information leakage.
5.2 System Overview
Aimed at quantifying the information leakage of a feature or a
set of features, we design and develop our Website Fingerprint
Density Estimation, or WeFDE. Compared with existing systems
such as leakiEst [10], WeFDE is able to measure joint information
leakage for more than one feature, and it is particularly designed
for measuring the leakage from WF defenses, in which a feature
could be partly continuous and partly discrete.
Figure 3 shows the architecture ofWeFDE. The information leak-
age quantification begins with the Website Fingerprint Modeler,
which estimates the probability density functions of features. In
case of measuring joint information of features, Mutual Informa-
tion Analyzer is activated to help the Modeler to refine its models
to mitigate the curse of dimensionality. During the information
leakage quantification, the Website Fingerprint Modeler is used to
generate samples. By Monte Carlo approach [21] (see Appendix G
for more information), the Information Leakage Quantifier derives
the final information leakage by evaluating and averaging the sam-
ples’ leakage. In the following, we describe our modules.
5.3 Website Fingerprint Modeler
The task ofWebsite Fingerprint Modeler is tomodel the probability
density function (PDF) of features. A popular approach is to use a
histogram. However, as the traffic features exhibit a great range of
variety, it’s hard to decide on the number of bins andwidth.WeFDE
adopts Adaptive Kernel Density Estimate (AKDE) [39], which out-
performs histogram in smoothness and continuity. AKDE is a non-
parametric method to estimate a random variable’s PDF. It uses
kernel functions—a non-negative function that integrates to one
and has mean zero—to approximate the shape of the distribution.
Choosing proper bandwidths is important for AKDE to make
an accurate estimate. WeFDE uses the plug-in estimator [43] for
continuous features, and in case of failure, WeFDE uses the rule-of-
thumb approach [43] as the alternative. If the feature is discrete, we
let the bandwidth be a very small constant (0.001 in this paper). The
choice of the small constant has no impact on the measurement, as
long as each website uses the same constant as the bandwidth.
To model the features’ PDFs in WF defenses, WeFDE has two
special properties. Firstly, our AKDE can handle a feature which is
partly continuous and partly discrete (or in other words, a mixture
of continuous and discrete random variables). Such features exist
in a WF defense such as BuFLO [11] which always sends at least T
seconds. These features would be discrete if the genuine traffic can
be completed within timeT , otherwise, the features would be con-
tinuous. Secondly, our AKDE is able to distinguish a continuous-
like discrete feature. Take transmission time as an example. This
feature is used to be continuous, but when defenses such as Tama-
raw [6] are applied, the feature would become discrete. Our mod-
eler is able to recognize such features. Formore details, please refer
to Appendix C.
We further extend WeFDE to model a set of features by adopt-
ing the multivariate form of AKDE. However, when applying mul-
tivariate AKDE to estimate a high dimensional PDF, we find AKDE
inaccurate. The cause is the curse of dimensionality: as the dimen-
sion of the PDF increases, AKDE requires exponentially more ob-
servations for accurate estimate. Considering that the set of fea-
tures to be measured jointly could be large (3043 features in case
of total information measurement), we need dimension reduction
techniques. In the following, we introduce ourMutual Information
Analyzer to mitigate the curse of dimensionality.
5.4 Mutual Information Analyzer
The introduction of Mutual Information Analyzer is for mitigat-
ing the curse of dimensionality in multivariate AKDE. It helps the
Website Fingerprint Modeler to prune the features which share re-
dundant information with other features, and to cluster features
by dependency for separate modelling.
This Analyzer is based on the features’ pairwisemutual informa-
tion. To make the mutual information of any two features have the
same range, WeFDE normalizes it by Kvalseth’s method [29] (other
normalization approaches [45] may also work). Let NMImax(c, r )
denote the normalized mutual information between feature c and
r , then it equals to:
NMImax(c, r ) =
I (c;r )
max{H (c),H (r )}
Since I (c; r ) is less than or equal toH (c) andH (r ), NMImax(c, r ) is in
[0, 1]. A higher value of NMImax(c, r ) indicates higher dependence
between r and c , or in other words, they share more information
with each other.
Grouping By Dependency. A workaround from curse of dimen-
sionality in higher dimension is to adoptNaive Bayes method,which
assumes the set of features to be measured is conditionally inde-
pendent. Naive Bayes requires many fewer observations, thanks
to the features’ probability distribution separately estimated. How-
ever, we find dependence between some features of the website
fingerprint, violating the assumption of Naive Bayes.
We adopt Kononenko’s algorithm (KA) [8, 27], which clusters
the highly-dependent features into disjoint groups. In each group,
we model the joint PDF of its features by applying AKDE. Among
different groups, conditional independence is assumed. KA takes
the advantage of how Naive Bayes mitigates the curse of dimen-
sionality, while keeping realistic assumptions about conditional in-
dependence between groups.
We use clustering algorithms to partition the features into dis-
joint groups. An ideal clustering algorithm is expected to guaran-
tee that any two features in the same group have dependence larger
than a threshold, and the dependence of the features in different
groups is smaller than the same threshold. This threshold allows us
to adjust independence degree between any two groups. We find
that DBSCAN [13] is able to do so.
DBSCAN is a density-based clustering algorithm. It assigns a
feature to a cluster if this feature’s distance from any feature of the
cluster is smaller than a threshold ϵ , otherwise the feature starts
a new cluster. Such a design enables DBSCAN to meet our goal
above. To measure features’ dependence, we calculate their nor-
malized pairwise mutual information matrixM ; then to fit in with
DBSCAN, we convert M into a distance matrix D by D = 1 − M ,
where 1 is a matrix of ones. A feature would have distance 0 with
itself, and distance 1 to an independent feature. We can tune ϵ in
DBSCAN to adjust the degree of independence between groups.
We choose ϵ = 0.4 in the experiments based on its empirical per-
formance in the trade-off between its impact on information mea-
surement accuracy and KA’s effectiveness in dimension reduction.
Wemodel the PDF of the fingerprint by assuming independence
between groups. Suppose KA partitions the fingerprint ®f into k
groups, ®g1, ®g2, · · · , ®gk , with each feature belonging to one and only
one group. To evaluate the probability p(®f |cj ), we instead calcu-
late pˆ(®g1 |cj )pˆ(®g2 |cj ) · · · pˆ(®gk |cj ), where pˆ(·) is the PDF estimated
by AKDE.
As a hybrid of the AKDE and Naive Bayes, Kononenko’s algo-
rithm avoids the disadvantages of each. First, Kononenko’s algo-
rithm does not have the incorrect assumption that the fingerprint
features are independent. It only assumes independence between
groups, as any two of them have mutual information below ϵ . Sec-
ond, Kononenko’s algorithm mitigates the curse of dimensional-
ity. The groups in Kononenko’s algorithm have much less features
than the total number of features.
Dimension Reduction. Besides the KA method to mitigate the
curse of dimensionality, we employ two other approaches to fur-
ther reduce the dimension.
The first approach is to exclude features being represented by
other features. We use the pairwise mutual information to find
pairs of features that have higher mutual information than a thresh-
old (0.9 in this paper). Thenwe prune the feature set by eliminating
one of the features and keeping the other.
Our second approach is to pick out a number of the most infor-
mative features to approximate all features’ information leakage.
Given a set of features to measure, we sort the features by their
individual information leakage. Instead of measuring all features’
information leakage, we pick out top n features that leak the most
information about the visited websites. The measurement results
by varying n are shown in Figure 8 and Figure 12. It shows that
withn increasing, the topn features’ information leakage would in-
crease at first but finally reach a plateau. This phenomenon shows
that the information leakage of sufficient top informative features
is able to approximate that of the overall features. Such observation
is also backed by [22], which discovered that including more top
informative features beyond 100 had little gain for classification.
We didn’t choose other dimension reduction methods such as
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [23]. Our goal is to mitigate
the curse of dimensionality in modelling website fingerprints by
AKDE; but methods like PCA transform website fingerprints into
opaque componentswhich are much less understandable. More im-
portantly, our experimental results demonstrate the poor perfor-
mance of PCA. Figure 4 shows that the percentage of variance re-
tained when PCA reduces to a specific dimension. Note that the
percentage of variance is the popular approach to estimate the in-
formation loss in PCA. It displays that if our goal is to reduce the
dimension from 3043 to 100, the percentage of variance retained af-
ter PCA is under 50%, indicating high information loss. Thus, PCA
doesn’t fit in our case.
TheResults. Figure 5 displays the outcomeof ourMutual Informa-
tion Analyzer. We pick out 100 most informative features (exclud-
ing the redundant ones), and we apply Mutual Information Ana-
lyzer to obtain 6 clusters. Figure 5 shows how many features each
category contributes, and which cluster the feature belongs to.
We find that redundant features are pervasive among the highly
informative features.We look at 183most informative features, and
45.36% of them are redundant. This phenomenon suggests future
feature set engineering may be able to find many redundant fea-
tures to prune without hurting its performance for website finger-
prints.
Figure 5 shows a cluster may consist of features from different
categories. For example, Cluster2 has features from category 1, 8,
and 14, and Cluster3 has features from category 1, 3, and 14. This
phenomenon shows features from different categories may share
much information (that’s why they are clustered together). Figure
5 also shows features from same category are not necessarily in
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Figure 4: the Percentage of Variance Retained in PCA. Per-
centage of variance indicates the information loss in PCA
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Figure 5: The Clustering Results of Mutual Information An-
alyzer. 6 clusters are found for the most informative and non-
redundant 100 features.
the same cluster. For instance, the category 4 features are clustered
into three different clusters.
Figure 5 also shows that categories do not necessarily have fea-
tures to be included in clusters. We find that some categories lack
top informative features, ending up with absence of their features
in clusters. Here, we clarify that we don’t claim WeFDE to be free
of information loss. In fact, just like other dimension reduction ap-
proaches such as PCA, there is information loss inWeFDE, but it is
minimal [22]. It’s also worth noting that though some categories or
features are not chosen by WeFDE, this doesn’t necessarily mean
all of their information is lost, as their information may be shared
and represented by other included categories or features.
Looking at 83 redundant features, we find 33 of them are re-
dundant with total packet count. These features include incoming
packet count and 2-gram (-1,-1), but exclude outgoing packet count
(NMI between total and outgoing packet count is 0.4414). The rea-
son is that the number of incoming packets are much more than
the number of outgoing packets in website browsing, so that total
packet count is highly dependent on incoming packet count.
Due to page limit, we release all our measurement results in our
GitHub repository.
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Figure 6: Information Leakage of Individual Features: Empir-
ical Cumulative Distribution Function (ECDF) in the closed-world
setting.
6 CLOSED-WORLD INFORMATION LEAKAGE
In closed-world setting, an attacker is assumed to know the possi-
ble websites that a user may visit. The information leakage under
this setting comes to which website is visited. Appendix D gives
more details about how to calculate this information. In the mea-
surement, We adoptAlexa top 100websites with 55779 visits in our
closed-world setting, as is shown in Table 1. We assume equal prior
probability for websites, and we set Monte Carlo sample number
to 5000. We measure 3043 features’ individual information leakage
and their joint leakage by categories. We run this measurement
and the following ones of this paper on a workstationwith 32 cores
(Intel Xeon CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz). The measurement time
differs depending on the settings, but a typical measurement like
the setting here can be finished within 10 hours. The following in-
troduces part of our results. Full measurement results can be found
at our anonymous GitHub repository.
Individual Information Leakage. Our measurement results
upon individual features are shown in Figure 6. Among these 3043
features, we find: (a) 2.1% features leak more than 3 bits informa-
tion, meaning that an attacker is able to narrow down the possibil-
ities to one eighth by any of these features; (b) 19.91% features leak
less than 3 bit but more than 2 bits information; (c) 23.43% features
leak 1 bit to 2 bits information; and (d) 54.55% features leak less
than 1 bit information. It is clear that nearly half of the features
are able to help an attacker to reduce the size of the anonymity set
by half. Yet our experiment shows that a single feature leaks no
more than 3.45 bits information, which is the maximum leakage
we observe in our experiment from the feature of rounded out-
going packet count. We also observe that outgoing packet count
without rounding leaks 3.26 bits information, 0.19 bit less than the
rounded one. We observe similar information leakage increase by
rounding for total packet count and incoming packet count. Our
results confirm the observation in [36] that rounding packet count
can help website fingerprinting attacks.
Web-browsing is characterized by asymmetric traffic. The in-
coming packets, which contain the requested contents, usually out-
number the outgoing packets carrying the request. A natural ques-
tion is, does download stream having more packets leak more in-
formation than upload stream? The answer is no: download stream
leaks 3.04 bits information, 0.22 bit less than the incoming stream.
Our measurement suggests that defense design should give no less
(if not more) attention to upload stream in hiding both streams’
packet count.
Themost informative timing feature is the average of inter-packet
timing for download stream with 1.43 bit leakage. Among inter-
packet timing features, the maximum leaks the least information
with around 0.7 bit leakage. Another category of timing features
is transmission time. We observe that the information leakage in-
creases from 25% percentile to 100% percentile transmission time.
The most information leakage for transmission time comes to the
total transmission time, which leaks 1.21 bit information. Further-
more, our measurement shows that information leakage of timing
features has little difference for upload and download stream.
We also experiment the impact of world size on individual fea-
ture’s information leakage. We try to answer: with a larger world
size, whether the information leakage of indiviual features increases
or decreases. We further adopt Alexa top 500 and top 1000 sep-
arately for closed-world setting, and we conduct the same infor-
mation leakage measurement as above. Note that the information
leakage upper bound under the world size 100, 500, and 1000 is
6.64, 8.97, and 9.97 bits, respectively. Our finding is that the im-
pact of world size on information leakage is minimal, as is shown
in Figure 7. Particularly, when the world size increases from 500
to 1000, the features’ individual information leakage is almost the
same. Further analysis will be given in Appendix F.
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Figure 7: Closed-World Setting: Information Leakage for Individual Features (bit). Individual features have similar leakage with
world size of 500 and 1000, indicating likely maximums
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grows with the world size, indicating that these categories of features can be used to distinguish between larger sets of websites
Joint Information Measurement.Among the 100 most infor-
mative features, many of the features share redudant information
with other features. We set a threshold to 0.9, and if two features
have mutual information larger than 0.9, we would consider a fea-
ture sharing most of its information with another one. Our results
show that 62 of the 100 most informative features can be repre-
sented by the other 38 features, demonstrating the prevalence of
redundant features in website fingerprint. This finding shows the
necessity and effectiveness of our Mutual Information Analyzer in
recognizing features sharing redundant information. Figure 8 also
shows that after including sufficient non-redundant features, the
category information leakage tends to reach plateau. This phenom-
enon shows that we can approximate the information of a category
by including sufficient non-redundant most informative features in
this category.
Categories such as Time, Ngram, Transposition, Interval-II, Interval-
III, Packet Distribution, Packet per Second, and CUMUL leak most
of the information about the visited websites; other categories such
as Packet Count, Interval-I, Burst, First20, First30 Packet Count,
Last30 Packet Count leak 5.75, 5.86, 6.2, 4.20, 1.29, and 1.03 bits
information, respectively. Our measurement shows that Interval-
II and Interval-III leak more information than Inerval-I, with 6.63
bits for both Interval-II and Interval-III. In addition, we find that
Interval-II and Interval-III are faster than Interval-I in reaching the
plateau, indicating the former twos not only leakmore information
but also with less features. It is clear that recording intervals by
their frequency of packet count (adopted in Interval-II and Interval-
III) is more preferable than recording them in sequence (Interval-I).
We also experiment the impact of world-size on information
leakage upon categories in closed-world setting. We find that with
the increase of world size, most categories exhibit more informa-
tion leakage, except First30 and Last30 Packet Count. Note that
categories such as First20, Burst, Packet Count show little increase
when the world size increases from 1000 to 2000. We leave the dis-
cussion to Appendix F.
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7 VALIDATION
This section validates ourmeasurement results by bootstrapping [12].
Bootstrapping is a statistical technique which uses random sam-
pling with replacement to measure the properties of an estimator.
More details about bootstrapping are given in Appendix A.
Measurement Validation. This section shows how accurate
our measurement is. We adopt bootstrapping with 20 trials to give
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Figure 10: Dataset and Generalization: the 90% confidence in-
terval by bootstrapping
the 90% confidence interval for the information leakage measure-
ment. Figure 9 (a) shows the confidence intervals for top 100 most
informative features. We find that the width of the intervals is less
than 0.178 bit, and the median is around 0.1 bit. Figure 9 (b) gives
the 90% confidence interval for 15 categories. Thewidth of these in-
tervals is less than 0.245 bit, with the median 0.03 bit. We find that
the interval of interval-I has the largest width. The bootstrapping
results validate our information leakage measurement.
Dataset Validation.We use the top 100 Alexa websites in the
closed-world setting, as do previous works. But what if the top
100 Alexa websites are not representative for Tor networks? Do
our information leakage results still hold?While the representative
websites are still unknown, we are able to validate our results by
bootstrapping.
In the experiment, we have 2200 websites for bootstrapping. In
each round, we randomly sample 100 websites without replace-
ment to construct the bootstrapped dataset. Here we didn’t use
sampling with replacement because it makes less sense that the
same website is included twice in a bootstrapped dataset. This spe-
cial bootstrapping technique is also called subsampling [38]. Re-
peating the same procedure n times (n = 20 in our experiment),
we have n such datasets to obtain n bootstrapped measurements.
Finally, we get the bootstrapped confidence interval for validation.
Figure 10 displays the 90% confidence interval for the top 100
most informative features and 15 categories of features. Not sur-
prisingly, including different websites in the closed-world setting
does make a difference in the measurement, but Figure 10 shows
such impact is very limited. Among top 100 informative features,
most of them have confidence interval with less than 0.5 bit width,
so do most of categories (even less for some categories). The ex-
ception only comes to category Interval-I. By bootstrapping, we
validate our information leakage results even when the true repre-
sentative websites are still unknown.
8 INFORMATION LEAKAGE IN WF DEFENSES
This section firstly gives the theoretical analysis on why accuracy
is not a reliable metric to validate a WF defense. Then we measure
theWF defenses’ information leakage to confirm the analysis. Note
that we choose the closed-world setting in the evaluation, as the
setting ismost advantageous for attackers, and we can get an upper
bound for the defense’s security.
8.1 Accuracy and Information Leakage
The popular method to tell whether a WF defense is secure or not
is to look at the classification accuracy under different WF attacks.
If the defense is able to achieve low classification accuracy, it is
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Figure 11: Website Fingerprinting Defenses: Accuracy vs. In-
formation Leakage.Upon each type of defensed traces, we evalu-
ate the overall information leakage and the classification accuracy
at the same time. The results demonstrate the discrepancy between
accuracy and information leakage
believed to be secure. Here, we raise the question: does low clas-
sification accuracy always mean low information leakage? This
question matters because if not, low classification accuracy would
not be sufficient to validate a WF defense. To answer this question,
we analyze the relation between information leakage and accuracy.
We find that given a specific accuracy, the actual information leak-
age is far from certain.
Theorem 1. Let {c1, c2, · · · , cn } denote a set of websites with
prior probabilitiesp1,p2, · · · ,pn , andvi denote a visit to website ci .
Suppose a website fingerprinting classifier D which recognizes a
visit vi to be D(vi ). The classifier would succeed if D(vi ) = ci , oth-
erwise it fails. Assume a defense has been applied, and this classi-
fier has α accuracy in classifying each website’s visits. Then the in-
formation leakage obtained by the classifier is uncertain: the range
of the possible information leakage is
(1 − α)loд2(n − 1) (3)
Proof: see Appendix B
The reason for such uncertainty is that classification accuracy
is "all-or-nothing". The classifier just makes one trial, and accu-
racy counts a miss as failure. But even a miss doesn’t necessarily
mean no information leakage. It is possible that the attacker could
make a hit with the second or third trials, which indicates high in-
formation leakage; it also possible that the attacker could not do
so without many trials, which equals to low information leakage.
Accuracy alone cannot tell which case is true, as a result, the infor-
mation leakage for a given accuracy is uncertain.
An Example. Figure 1 shows an example for the theorem. Note
that the range is invariable no matter what we assume for websites’
prior probability. We can see a wide range of possible information
leakage when a low accuracy is given, showing that low accuracy
doesn’t necessarily guarantee low information leakage.
8.2 Measurement Results for WF defenses
We include Tamaraw [6], BuFLO [11], Supersequence [46], WTF-
PAD [25], and CS-BuFLO [5] to quantify the information leakage
upon defensed traffic.
We adopt the implementation of BuFLO, Tamaraw, and Super-
sequence [2] to generate the defensed traffic, with τ =5, 10, 20,
30, 40, 50, 60, 80, 100, or 120 for BuFLO, L ranging from 10 to 100
with step 10 and from 200 to 1000 with step 100 for Tamaraw. We
include the method 3 of Supersequence, with 2, 5, or 10 super clus-
ters, and 4, 8, or 12 stopping points. We also include the method
4 of Supersequence, with 2 super clusters, 4 stopping points, and
2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 20, 35, or 50 clusters. We use the implementation [1]
to create the WTF-PAD traffic. We were recommended to use the
default normal_rcv distributions on our dataset, as finding an op-
timal set of distributions for a new dataset is currently a work in
progress [1]. We apply the KNN classifier [46] on our WTF-PAD
traces, and we can get similar accuracy (18.03% in our case). This
classification result validates our WTF-PAD traces. We use the im-
plementation [18] to generate simulated CS-BuFLO traces.
Upon each type of defensed traces, we evaluate the overall in-
formation leakage and the classification accuracy at the same time.
The measurement is conducted in closed-world setting with 94
websites. To evaluate the total information leakage, we assume
equal prior probability for websites and adopt k = 5000 for Monte
Carlo Evaluation. We use bootstrapping with 50 trials to estimate
the 96% confidence interval for the information leakage and accu-
racy. For details about bootstrapping, please see Appendix A. Note
thatwe redo the dimension reductions for each defense, as aWF de-
fense changes the information leakage of a feature and the mutual
information between any two features. The classifier we adopt is a
variant of the KNN classifier [46]. The only change we make is the
feature set: we use our own feature set instead of its original one.
The purpose is to have equivalent feature sets for classifications
and information leakage measurements. The reason for choosing
this KNN classifier is that it is one of the most popular website
fingerprinting classifiers to launch attacks and evaluate defense
mechanisms. It’s also worth noting that the original feature set of
the KNN classifier is a subset of our feature set. The experimental
results are shown in Figure 11.
8.3 Accuracy is inaccurate
Accuracy is widely used to compare the security of different de-
fenses. A defense mechanism is designed and tuned to satisfy a
lower accuracy as an evidence of superiority over existing defenses [11].
With defense overhead being considered, new defensemechanisms [6,
25] are sought and configured to lower the overhead without sacri-
ficing accuracy too much. But if accuracy fails to be a reliable met-
ric for security, it would become a pitfall and mislead the design
and deployment of defense mechanisms. This section describes the
flaws of accuracy and proves such a possibility.
Accuracy may fail because of its dependence on specific
classifiers. If a defense achieves low classification accuracy, it’s
not safe to conclude that this defense is secure, since the used clas-
sifiers may not be optimal. More powerful classifiers may exist and
output higher classification accuracy. We prove this possibility in
our experiment. To validate WTF-PAD, four classifiers were used
including the original KNN classifier, and the reported highest ac-
curacy was 26%. But using the KNN classifier with our feature set,
we observe 33.99% accuracy. Recent work [42] even achieves 90%
accuracy against WTF-PAD. This work also confirms our measure-
ment that the information leakage of WTF-PAD is high (6.4 bits),
indicating that WTF-PAD is not secure. Thus, accuracy is not re-
liable to validate a defense because of its dependence on specific
classifiers.
Defenses having equivalent accuracy may leak varying
amount of information. Figure 11 demonstrates such a phenom-
enon when taking BuFLO (τ = 40) and Tamaraw (L = 10) into con-
sideration. Accuracy of both defenses is nearly equivalent, with
9.39% for BuFLO and 9.68% for Tamaraw. In sense of accuracy, Bu-
FLO (τ = 40) was considered to be as secure as Tamaraw(L = 10).
However, our experimental results disapprove such a conclusion,
showing BuFLO (τ = 40) leaks 2.31 bits more information than
Tamaraw (which leaks 3.26 bits information). We observe the sim-
ilar phenomenon between WTF-PAD and Supersequence.
More importantly, a defense believed to be more secure
by accuracymay leakmore information. Take BuFLO (τ = 60)
as an example. Its accuracy is 7.39%, while accuracy of Tamaraw
with L = 10, 20, 30 is 9.68%, 9.15%, and 8.35% respectively. Ac-
curacy supports BuFLO (τ = 60) is more secure than Tamaraw
with L = 10, 20, 30. However, our measurement shows that BuFLO
(τ = 60) leaks 4.56 bit information, 1.3 bit, 1.61 bit, and 1.75 bit
more than Tamaraw with L = 10, 20, 30! Take WTF-PAD as an-
other example. The accuracy for WTF-PAD is 33.99%, much lower
than the 53.19% accuracy of Supersequence method 4 with 2 su-
per clusters, 50 clusters, and 4 stopping points. But the informa-
tion leakage of WTF-PAD is around 6.4 bits, much higher than the
leakage of the latter which is about 5.6 bits. Our experimental re-
sults prove the unreliability of accuracy in comparing defenses by
security.
9 OPEN-WORLD INFORMATION LEAKAGE
In the closed-world scenario, the attacker knows all possible web-
sites that a user may visit, and the goal is to decide which website
is visited; In the open-world setting, the attacker has a set of mon-
itored websites and tries to decide whether the monitored web-
sites are visited and which one. The difference in information leak-
age is that the open-world has n + 1 possible outcomes, whereas
the closed-world has n outcomes where n is the number of (moni-
tored) websites. We include the details about how to quantify this
information in Appendix D. The following describes part of our
results for the open-world information leakage. For more informa-
tion, please visit our GitHub repository.
Experiment Setup. We adopt the list of monitored websites
from [46] and collected 17984 traffic instances in total. Our non-
monitored websites come from Alexa’s top 2000 with 137455 in-
stances in total. We approximate the websites’ prior probability by
Zipf law [4, 19], which enables us to estimate awebsite’s prior prob-
ability by its rank.We conduct experimentswith top 500, 1000, 2000
non-monitored websites separately, andwe show the experimental
results in Figure 12.
Figure 12 shows that the open-world information leakage is de-
creasedwhen includingmore non-monitoredwebsites, with 1.82, 1.71, 1.62
bit for top500, top1000, top2000, respectively. Including more non-
monitored websites decreases the entropy of the open-world set-
ting rather than increasing it. The reduced information is in part
because of the prior onmonitoredwebsites. Comparedwith closed-
world setting with similar world size, open-world scenario carries
much less information.
Similar with the closed-world setting, Figure 12 shows that most
categories except First20, First30 and Last30 Packet count, and Interval-
I leak most of the information. This shows that the difference in
world setting has little impact on categories’ capability in leaking
information.
We also investigate how the size of the non-monitored web-
sites influences our measurement. We focus on the total leakage
and build the AKDE models for the non-monitored websites with
the varying size of the non-monitored, respectively. We evaluate
how the difference of these AKDEmodels influences measurement.
Specifically, we evaluate (a) how monitored samples are evaluated
at these AKDE models, and (b) how samples generated by these
AKDE models are evaluated at the monitored AKDE. Figure 13
shows the results. Figure 13 (a) shows that these AKDE models of
the non-monitored, though differing in size, assign low probability
(below 10−10 with 95% percentile) to monitored samples. Figure 13
(b) shows that though these AKDE models for the non-monitored
generate different samples, the difference on how these samples
are evaluated by the AKDE model of the monitored is little: they
are all assigned low probability below 10−20 with 95% percentile.
The results lead to the estimation that introducing extra lower
rank websites into the non-monitored set would not significantly
change the low probability that the non-monitored AKDE assigns
to monitored samples, and the low probability that the monitored
AKDE assigns to samples generated by the non-monitored AKDE,
thanks to the low prior probability of these websites. The informa-
tion leakage is therefore little impacted.
10 DISCUSSION
WFDefense Evaluation.We have discussed why using accuracy
alone to validate a WF defense is flawed. Note that we don’t mean
thatWF defense designers should keep away from accuracy. In fact,
accuracy is straightforward and easy to use, and it is suitable for
the initial check on WF defense design: if the classification accu-
racy is high, then the defense design is not secure. But if the clas-
sification accuracy is low, it doesn’t necessarily mean the defense
is secure. We recommend defense designers to include other meth-
ods to further validate the defense. A potential approach to use
is top-k accuracy, which allows WF attackers to make k guesses
instead of one, and if the k guesses contain the right one, then
the attackers succeed, otherwise, they lose. Another approach is
information leakage measurement tools such as WeFDE. WeFDE
gives information-theoretic perspective in evaluatingWF defenses.
When evaluating a defense by a classifier, a test case unseen by
the training dataset is likely to be misclassified. But we can imag-
ine that enlarging the dataset would effectively avoid such mis-
classification. This issue favors the defense design, and it is more
likely to happen in probabilistic defenses such as WTF-PAD. Us-
ing WeFDE to evaluate a defense doesn’t have this problem, as all
data points are used to build the model for information leakage
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Figure 12: Open-World Setting: Information Leakage by Categories. This figure shows that the difference in world setting has little
impact on categories’ capability in leaking information
measurement. In addition, WeFDE is independent from any clas-
sifier, and it avoids the flaw of accuracy. The comparison of these
approaches in validating WF defenses is out of the scope of this
paper, and we leave it in our future work.
WeFDE’s Other Applications. WeFDE can be used to launch
website fingerprinting attacks.WeFDEmodels the likelyhood func-
tion of website fingerprints, so that given a test case, WeFDE is
able to decide the probability of the test case being a visit to each
website. It could be further combined with prior information about
likely destinations to draw Bayesian inference [20].
WeFDE can be used to bootstrap a defense design. WeFDE can
tell defense designers the information leakage from features and
categories, so that designers could be guided to work on specific
highly informative features and categories for hiding. In addition,
when defenses are designed for a individual server or client to
adopt [9], WeFDE could suggest popular fingerprints to emulate.
In our future work, we will explore more about using WeFDE to
bootstrap a defense design.
Limitations.One limitation ofWeFDE is its dependence on the
feature set. Thoughwe try to include all known features to general-
ize WeFDE’s results, unknown informative features may exist and
not be included. Fortunately, as long as new features are discovered
and reported by future studies, we can always update our feature
set and re-evaluate the leakage.
11 CONCLUSION
We develop a methodology and tools that allow measurement of
the information leaked by a website fingerprint. This gives us a
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Figure 13: Size of the Non-Monitored Websites and Open-
World Information LeakageMeasurement: (a) Monitored Sam-
ples at Non-Monitored AKDE, and (b) Non-Monitored Samples at
Monitored AKDE
more fine-grained analysis of WF defense mechanisms than the
“all-or-nothing” approach based on evaluating specific classifiers.
By measuring defenses’ information leakage and their accuracy,
we find that using classification accuracy to validate a defense is
flawed.
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A BOOTSTRAPPING: ACCURACY
ESTIMATION FOR INFORMATION
LEAKAGE QUANTIFICATION
Weuse bootstrapping [12] to estimate the accuracy of our information-
theoreticmeasurement. bootstrapping is a statistical techniquewhich
uses random sampling with replacement tomeasure the properties
of an estimator.
We implement bootstrapping to estimate the confidence inter-
val of the information leakage. We describe our bootstrapping in
the following:
• Step 1: for the observations of the each website, we apply
random sampling with replacement, in which every obser-
vation is equally likely to be drawed and is allowed to be
drawed more than once (with replacement). We let the sam-
pling size be equal to observation size.
• Step 2: we apply ourmeasurement on the newly constructed
dataset of resamples and obtain the information leakage.
• Step 3: Step 1 and Step 2 are repeated K times to obtain K
values for the information leakage; We therefore find the CI
confidence interval based on these K values.
Subsampling [38] is a special bootstrapping technique. It uses
samplingwithout replacement, and its sampling size is usuallymuch
smaller than the observation size.
B PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let I (D;V ) denote the information leakage that the classifier at-
tains. we have
I (D;V ) =H (D) − H (D |V )
=H (D) −
∑
vi ∈V
p(vi )H (D |vi ) (4)
We then evaluateH (D |vi ),vi ∈ V .With the accuracyα , we have
Pr (D = vi |vi ) = α . However, it is uncertain about the probability
Pr (D = vj |vi )where j , i , from the knowledge of the accuracy.We
put the possibility in two extremes to obtain the range of possible
evaluation. In one case, suppose that the classifier determinesvi to
be from the websiteC jˆ with probability 1−α , so that the maximum
of I (D;V ) is obtained as
max{I (D;V )} = H (D) + α log2 α + (1 − α) log2 (1 − α) (5)
In the other case, suppose that the probabilities Pr (D = vj |vi ) =
(1−α)/(n−1)where j , i , whichmeans that except the correct deci-
sion, the classifier determines the visit vi to belong to any website
other than Ci with equal probability. Such a case yields the mini-
mum possible information leakage, which is:
min{I (D;V )} = H (D) + α log2 α + (1 − α)loд2
1 − α
n − 1
(6)
As a result, the range of potential information leakage I (D;V )
conveyed by the accuracy α is
(1 − α)loд2(n − 1) (7)
C ADAPTIVE KERNEL DENSITY ESTIMATE
IN WEFDE
This section gives details about Adaptive Kernel Density Estimate
(AKDE) and the bandwidth selection approaches in WeFDE.
We start by how WeFDE applies AKDE to estimate a single fea-
ture’s probability distribution:
pˆ( f¯ |cj ) =
1
n
m∑
c=1
1
hc
K(
f¯ − pc
hc
) (8)
where
hc is the bandwidth in AKDE,
K(· ) is the kernel function of a Gaussian, and
p1,p2, · · · ,pm are the observations for f¯ in visiting cj
Choosing proper bandwidths is important for AKDE to make
an accurate estimate. If a feature is continuous, WeFDE adopts
plug-in estimator[43]. In case of failure, we use the rule-of-thumb
approach [43] as the alternative. If the feature is discrete, we let
the bandwidth be a very small constant (0.001 in this paper). The
choice of the small constant has no impact on the measurement, as
long as each website uses the same constant as the bandwidth in
its AKDE.
Our AKDE may model a discrete feature as if it’s continuous.
The reason is that the domain of the feature f¯ could be very large
and requires much more samples than we can collect in order to
accurately estimate in discrete. Take total packet count of Face-
book.com as an example. We observe 238 different values from our
600 samples in the range of 576 and 1865. If the feature is processed
as discrete, the estimated probability for observed values would be
inaccurate, and the missed values would be considered impossible
in the inappropriate way. Our solution is to consider such a dis-
crete feature to be continuous, so that the kernels would smooth
the probability distribution estimation and assign an appropriate
probability to the missed values, making our measurement more
accurate.
Our AKDE is able to distinguish a continuous-like discrete fea-
ture. Take the feature of transmission time as an example. This
feature is used to be continuous, but when defenses such as Tama-
raw [6] are applied, the feature would become discrete. Our AKDE
is able to recognize by two approaches. The first approach is about
using a threshold β . If the same traffic instances are observed more
than β times in our dataset, these instances are distinguished as
discrete cases, and our AKDE would consider their features to be
discrete. The second approach is templatematching used in BuFLO
case. We precompute a pattern of traffic believed to be discrete, and
we consider the instances matching the pattern as discrete as well.
In case of BuFLO, the pattern is the resulted traffic instance with
transmission time τ .
Moreover, our AKDE can handle a feature which is partly con-
tinuous and partly discrete (or in other words, a mixture of con-
tinuous and discrete random variables). Such features exist in a
WF defense such as BuFLO [11] which always sends at least T sec-
onds. These features would be discrete if the genuine traffic can be
completedwithin timeT , otherwise, the features would be continu-
ous. Thanks to AKDE which allows different observations to have
their separate bandwidths, we compute the bandwidths separately
for discrete and continuous feature values. According to [14, 15],
AKDE is able to model a feature with mixed nature by selecting
adaptive bandwidths for its observations.
D INFORMATION LEAKAGE IN TWO
WORLDS
This section describes how to apply mutual information to quan-
tify the information leakage in the closed-world setting and the
open-world setting.
Closed-world Setting. Suppose C is a random variable denot-
ing possible websites that a user may visit. Then the information
leakage I (F ;C) in the closed-world scenario is:
I (C ;F ) = H (C) − H (C |F )
H (C) = −
∑
ci ∈C
Pr(ci ) log2 Pr(ci )
H (C |F ) =
∫
Φ
p(x)H (C |x)dx
(9)
where
Pr (ci ) is the probability that the visited website is ci ,
Φ is the domain for the feature F , and
p(x) is the probability density function for variable x .
Open-world Setting. The information leakage I (F ;O) in the
open-world scenario is:
I (F ;O) = H (O) − H (O |F ) (10)
H (O) = −
∑
ci ∈M
Pr(ci ) log2 Pr(ci )
−


∑
c j ∈N
Pr(cj )


log2 {
∑
c j ∈N
Pr(cj )}
(11)
H (O |F ) =
∫
F
p(f )H (O | f )d f (12)
H (O | f ) = −
∑
ci ∈M
Pr(ci | f ) log2(Pr(ci | f ))
−


∑
c j ∈N
Pr(cj | f )


log2 {
∑
c j ∈N
Pr(cj | f )}
(13)
where O is a random variable denoting the visited website be-
longs to the monitored or the non-monitored, and if it is moni-
tored, which one.M denotes the monitored set of websites, and N
denotes the non-monitored set of websites. F denotes the domain
for feature F .
E FEATURE SET
The following lists the 14 categories of features which are included
in the state-of-art attacks.
1. Packet count. Counting the number of packets is found help-
ful for an attacker. Specifically, we include the following features
based on packet count: (a) the total packet count, (b) the count of
outgoing packets, (c) the count of incoming packets, (d) the ratio
between the incoming packet count and that of the total, and (e)
the ratio between the outgoing packet count and that of the total.
2. Time Statistics. Firstly, we look at the packet inter-arrival time
for the total, incoming, and outgoing streams, individually. We ex-
tract the following statistics and add them into our feature set: (a)
maximum, (b) mean, (c) standard deviation, and (d) the third quar-
tile. Secondly, we embrace the features based on transmission time.
We add the first, second, third quartile and total transmission time
into our feature set.
3–4. Packet Ordering. we explore the n-gram features which are
widely adopted features extracting packet ordering. A n-gram is a
contiguous sequence of n packet lengths from a traffic sequence.
Let’s take 2-gram as an example. Suppose the traffic sequence is
〈(l1, t1), (l2, t2), (l3, t3), (l4, t4)〉, then the 2-grams are (l1, l2), (l2, l3)
and (l3, l4). We consider the frequencies of each grams as features
and we measure bigram, trigram, 4-gram, 5-gram, and 6-gram for
comparison.
In addition, the number of packets transmitted before each suc-
cessive incoming or outgoing packets also captures the ordering
of the packets. We record such features by scanning the first 300
packets of the incoming and those of the outgoing respectively.
5–7 and 9. Intervals and Bursts.We firstly adopt interval-based
features to capture the traffic bursts. An interval is defined as a
traffic window between a packet and the previous packet with the
same direction.
We use two approaches for interval-based features: Interval-I [46]
records the first 300 intervals of incoming packets and those of the
outgoing, Interval-II [40] uses a vector V in which V(i) records the
number of intervals with the packet number i . We use two vec-
tors to count the incoming and outgoing intervals separately, and
we fix the vectors’ dimension to be 300 (An interval having more
than 300 packets is counted as a interval with 300 packets). We
also apply grouping [36] on V to obtain extra features:
∑5
i=3 V(i),∑8
i=6 V(i), and
∑13
i=9 V(i). We name this approach to be Interval-III.
We also adopt [46]’s approach of counting the bursts for outgo-
ing packets. A burst of outgoing packets is defined as a sequence
of outgoing packets, in which there are no two adjacent incoming
packets. We extract the packet number in each burst and use the
maximum and the average as features. We also add the total burst
number, as well as the number of bursts with more than 5 packets,
10 packets, and 20 packets, respectively.
8. Packet Distribution.We divide the packet sequence into non-
overlapping chunks of 30 packets and count the number of outgo-
ing packets in first 200 chunks as features. We ignore the chunks
after the 200 chunks if any, and pad 0s to have 200 features in case
of having less than 200 chunks[46].
We also apply the approaches in [22] to have additional features:
(a) calculate the standard deviation, mean, median, and maximum
of the 200 features, and (b) split them into 20 evenly sized subsets
and sum each subset to be new features.
10–12. First 30 and Last 30 Packets.We explore the information
leakage from the first and last 30 packets. Particularly, we include
first 20 packets as features, and we extract the packet count fea-
tures (incoming packet count and outgoing packet count) from the
first and last 30 packets, respectively.
13. Packet count Per Second.We count the packet number in ev-
ery second. To make the feature number fixed, we count the first
100 seconds and pad 0s if the transmission time is less than 100 sec-
onds. The standard deviation, mean, median, minimum, and maxi-
mum of these features are also included.
We also include the alternative count of packets per second features[22].
We split the packet count per second features into 20 evenly sized
subsets and sum each subset to obtain the alternative features.
14. CUMUL Features. Panchenko et al. [34] introduce the CU-
MUL features. A cumulative representation is extracted from the
packet trace, and n features are derived by sampling the piecewise
linear interpolant of the representation at n equidistant points. We
adopt such features with n = 100.
It’s worth noting that “packet” here refers to a Tor cell packet.
We extract our features based on the cell packet traces. In addition,
in 2011 [36] includes a feature named HTMLmarker, which counts
the total size of incoming packets from the first outgoing packet
and the next outgoing packet. Such summation was considered to
be the size of theHTMLdocument and therefore is informative. We
find such claim is not accurate anymore, and we find no updated
details of how to reproduce such a feature. As a result, we do not
include this feature in our measurement.
F WORLD SIZE AND INFORMATION
LEAKAGE
In this section, we discuss the impact of the world size on our in-
formation leakage measurement.
We start with the closed-world setting. We observe that with
the increase of the world size, the information leakage for most
categories and the total increases as well, while the individual in-
formation leakage of features is little impacted (particularly when
the world size increases from 1000 to 2000). To explain the conflict-
ing observations, we highlight the notion of maximum possible in-
formation leakage of a setting. A feature (or a set of features) leaks
no more information than the information that the setting has. For
example, in our closed-world setting with 100 websites, the total
information leakage is 6.63 bits. But if we let the world size be 2,
the total leakage is no more than 1 bit, no matter how distinguish-
able the fingerprint is. Therefore we argue that the increased infor-
mation leakage with larger world size for most categories and the
total is because the website fingerprint has the ability to leak more
information than the information that our closed-world settings
have. This phenomenon leads to an interesting question: what is
the maximum information leakage the website fingerprint is able
to leak in a sufficiently larger world size, which we include in our
future work.
For the features’ individual information leakage, we observe that
the leakage in each setting is much less than the information that
these setting have, and that the world size has little impact on the
measurement. We explain the reason for the little impact of the
world size by the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Let’s consider x closed-world settings with equal
world size n. Suppose a feature F = f¯ has valid information leak-
age of I1, I2, · · · , Ix in each closed-world setting. In the combined
closed-world setting with nx world size, the information leakage
of F = f¯ would be I1+I2+· · ·+Ixx .
Proof: let’s denote the information leakage in each closed-world
setting to be:
Il = loд2(n) +
∑
l ∈{1, · · · ,n }
ql (i)loд2(ql (i)) (14)
, where ql (i) is the probability of visiting the ith website in the lth
closed-world setting conditioned on F = f¯ .
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Figure 14: Defenses with Different World Size.
In the combined closed-world setting, the information leakage
of F = f¯ is
loд2(nx) +
∑
l ∈{1, · · · ,x }
{
∑
i ∈{1, · · · ,n }
ql (i)
x
loд2(
ql (i)
x
)}
= loд2(n) +
1
x
∑
l ∈{1, · · · ,x }
∑
i ∈{1, · · · ,n }
ql (i)loд2(ql (i))
=
I1 + I2 + · · · + Ix
x
(15)
This theorem reveals the relation between world size and in-
formation leakage. With each closed-world setting including suf-
ficient websites, the combined larger world size would have little
impact on the information leakage.
We also evaluate world size impact on defenses in closed-world
setting. Figure 14 shows that in Tamaraw, world size has little im-
pact on information leakage. No matter how large the world size
is, the information leakage for Tamaraw is around 3.3, 2.72, 2.45
bits for L = 100, 500, 1000. BuFLO with τ = 120 is not impacted
by world size, but BuFLO with τ = 20, 60 see the increase of in-
formation leakage. The different impact from world size roots in
BuFLO’s mixed nature.
We discuss the world size impact on the open-world setting.
Here the world size refers to the size of the non-monitored web-
sites. We find that with a larger world size, the maximum informa-
tion leakage decreases. In addition, as is shown in Section 9, world
size also has little impact on the measure.
G MONTE CARLO INTEGRAL EVALUATION
We use the Monte Carlo method [17] to evaluate the integral when
measuring H (C | f¯ ). Monte Carlo picks random points in the do-
main and uses these points to numerically approximate the definite
integral:
H (C | f¯ ) ≃
1
k
k∑
i=1
H (C | f¯ (i )) (16)
where
f¯ (1), f¯ (2), · · · , f¯ (k) are the random samples, and
k is the size of the sample.
Note that we apply importance sampling here, in which random
samples are drawn from the distribution having probability density
function p( f¯ ). The sampling process is:
• Step 1: decide sampling size. To accurately evaluate the inte-
gral by Monte Carlo method, sufficent samples are needed.
In this paper, the total number of samples is set to be k =
5000. For each condition cj , j ∈ {1, · · · ,n}, the number of
samples is k · Pr(cj ).
• Step 2: sampling for different conditons. For each condition
cj , draw k · Pr(cj ) samples from the distribution with condi-
tional PDF p( f¯ |cj ).
We use this method to draw k samples from the generic PDF p( f¯ ).
We choose importance sampling over uniform domain sampling
(whichwould require a different estimation than Equation16) since
it includes more samples for feature values that are more likely to
happen. The benefit is that the “important” values in the integra-
tion are emphasized for higher precision.
